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Resumen. Posibilidad, actualidad y el crecimiento de la imaginación: la física cuántica según la interpretación de 
los universos múltiples  
Las interpretaciónes de la física cuántica de Everett-DeWitt hablan de una multiplicidad de mundos 
físicamente coexistenrtes. Éstas imaginativas reacciones a los problemas conceptuales de la mecánica 
cuántica estándar forman una família de propuestas de “universos múltiples” (PMW en su siglas 
inglesas) que, sin pleno éxito, han sido tachadas de incoherentes. 
Palabras clave:
Abstract
Everett-DeWitt interpretations of  quantum physics speak of  a multiplicity of  physically coexisting 
worlds. These imaginative reactions to the conceptual problems of  standard quantum mechanics 
form a family of  physicalist “many-worlds” proposals (PMW for short) that have been variously 
dismissed as “incoherent”, so far without full success.  A renewed charge by Hilary Putnam now 
seems to pose deeper trouble for PMW. In a recent paper, he seizes on “Schrödinger’s cat” situations 
to expose how PMW relativization of  actuality and basic combinatorics jointly ruin probabilistic 
talk. Putnam focuses on confirmation and luck. His case against PMW is thought-provoking but 
also questionable, or so I suggest in this paper. First I argue that, as presented, Putnam’s charge 
doesn’t go through. I then consider his argument proper. According to Putnam, experimental 
DeWittians must count themselves as “lucky” in a seriously incoherent sense. I consider his take on 
“luck” and deny that defenders of  PMW need to so regard themselves. Although extravagant, their 
position cannot be fruitfully dismissed as incoherent on metascientific grounds. Indeed it attests to 
the way science rationally helps the imagination to grow.
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1. Introduction 
Many-worlds interpretations regard the linear part of  quantum mechanics as adequate 
for providing a complete dynamical representation of  phenomena. In versions following 
DeWitt (1970), a measurement process physically “splits the world” in the sense of  
generally turning each of  the various possible outcomes into a sub-state or “branch” 
of  the total-world, the whole of  physical reality comprising all such branches. In recent 
proposals of  this variety (PMW for short), the “instantaneous collapse” of  the wave 
function (ordinarily associated with measurements and such) is traced to a branch-rooted, 
branch-relative aspect of  the phenomenon we call “awareness”. From this perspective, our 
experience as observers connects us with only this or that branch out of  many others which 
are just as real, and thus only to a tiny part of  the total physical universe. To get a fuller 
picture one needs to work out the complete wave function in accordance to the linear part 
of  quantum theory.
 Since its inception, this way of  understanding quantum mechanics has been variously 
faulted. Prominent among the critical issues raised are the need to specify a preferred  basis 
for the branching of  physical reality, conceptual issues about probabilities in quantum 
physics, also issues about the identity of  worlds and persons over time, and about the 
relationship between human consciousness and its physical substratum. A related but 
more poignant objection denies that one can ever rationally come to believe PMW.
 Although admittedly bizarre and initially very problematic, PMW has been much 
improved in recent decades. Unlike early versions of  the many-worlds approach (Everett 
1957, DeWitt 1970), the best current renditions no longer save the classical-like features 
of  ordinary experience by smuggling them in “by hand”; nor do they embody an arbitrarily 
chosen basis for the total state (as Everett and DeWitt proposals did), but rather let all 
such features emerge naturally from seemingly reasonable claims about prevailing physical 
conditions and interactions. In the most cogent present submissions (for example, by W.H. 
Zurek, 1998), the position basis gets naturally picked up as special by the locality of  regular 
physical interactions, a move helped by the phenomenon of  decoherence, which also helps 
address some important issues regarding measurement, world-branching, probabilities, 
and identity: 
(i) Interactions of  a completely general sort turn initially independent systems (i.e. 
ones represented by initially factorizable joint states of  composite observers and their 
environment) into entangled systems represented by complex quantum mechanical states 
made up of  effectively orthogonal “branches”. In the position basis, each component of  
those branches corresponds to an approximately classical world.
(ii) A quantum measurement is understood as a natural physical process in which a 
microscopic superposition is magnified (under the basic linear dynamics) up to a macroscopic 
scale. The general interactions involved in a measurement process spontaneously give rise 
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to different branches for each of  the possible measurement outcomes. 
 (iii) The distribution of  values that the quantum state links with “observable outcomes” 
turns out to satisfy the probability calculus to a remarkable high degree for magnitudes laying 
in the decoherence basis. 
(iv) Relevant work in recent metaphysics is brought to bear on standing conceptual issues, 
particularly Derek Parfit (1984) on identity of  persons and David Lewis (2004) on plurality 
of  worlds. 
 And so, current MPW might seem entitled to taking the quantum algorithm as 
yielding probabilities, albeit in a revisionary, Everettian relational sense available within 
each decohering branch. However, to some radical critics current PMW leaves untouched 
some conceptual difficulties, which they find terminally problematic. According to Hilary 
Putnam, in particular, PMW interpretations are untenable because, he maintains, such 
proposals give up the distinction between actuality and possibility, and -he adds- once one 
gives up that distinction the notion of  “probability” becomes incoherent (Putnam, 2005).  
2. Putnam’s probability argument
Consider the following “Schrödinger’s Cat experiment”. Imagine two light bulbs, one red 
and the other green, and suppose this is arranged so that either the red light goes on or 
the green light goes on when the interaction takes place (but not both). The probabilities 
may be unequal. Now let this experiment be performed many times. If, as PMW assumes, 
the world is relevantly governed by just the Schrödinger equation, in the course of  the 
first trial the total state will go into a superposition of  the form  p (Green Light lights)+ 
(1-p) (Red Light lights), where p is the probability that the green light goes on and (1-p) is 
the probability that the red light goes on. On PMW that means there will be two physical 
universes, in one of  which only the green light will be observed and in the second of  which 
only the red light will be observed. Like earlier critics, Putnam thinks that the numbers 
p and (1 – p) cannot be understood as probabilities of  the various particular outcomes 
actually occurring, because –he maintains - on PMW all the outcomes represented by 
branches with nonzero coefficients do materialize.
 Putnam asks,  “Why one doesn’t see a superposition of  red light on and green light on?” 
To which the PMW reply is: because the state vector p (Green Light)+ (1-p)(Red Light) is 
entangled with the observer’s state vector in the peculiar quantum mechanical way. That 
is, after the interaction, two physical universes exist, each with its own “continuation” of  
the original observer. In the first universe the observer sees the green light flash, and in the 
second he sees the red light flash. Accordingly, once the first experiment is performed, the 
total physical reality will have be two observers, one seeing a green light and the other a 
red light. If  the experiment is performed thirty times, at the end of  the runs there will be 
a “super-world” comprising 230 observers, along with 230 distinct “branch-histories”. 
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 Putnam invites us to imagine himself  as the person doing this experiment, and asks, 
“What is the probability in the naive sense – not the ‘probability’ in the quantum mechanical 
sense, but the probability in the sense of  the number of  my future histories in which I will 
observe that, say, the green light went on half  of  the time plus or minus 5% of  the time 
divided by the total number of  my future histories?”
Simple combinatorial analysis reveals an answer that is independent of  the quantum 
mechanical “probability”. But now this independence raises a worry: Why should one 
use quantum mechanical “probability” to predict what is likely to be observed? If  the 
coefficient p above is very small (something one can easily arrange for), then the histories 
in which Hilary Putnam confirms quantum mechanics will be exceedingly rare. But then, 
how come he is so lucky to have confirmed the theory? How come Putnam’s observations 
have so far been in accordance with quantum mechanical probability? 
 We thus get the following serious complaint: “on the Many Worlds interpretation, 
quantum mechanics is the first physical theory to predict that the observations of  most observers will 
disconfirm the theory” (Putnam 2005).  The intended philosophical moral of  this remark is 
quite worrying: 
... once you give up the distinction between actuality and possibility – as the Many 
Worlds interpretation in effect does, by postulating that all the quantum mechanical 
possibilities are actualized, each in its own physical universe – once you say that 
all possible outcomes are, ontologically speaking, equally actual – the notion of 
`probability’ loses all meaning.
 To Putnam, the idea of  having no collapse and no hidden variables “is incoherent” 
(2005).  But charges of  incoherence notoriously depend on some claims being taken for 
granted on metaphysical grounds.  This raises a big red flag on such charges. 
 My interest here is not to defend the plausibility of  the PMW approach, let alone 
endorse it, but to spell out the suspicious character of  quick dismissals of  revisionary 
physics based on metaphysical or commonsensical strictures. In the case of  PMW, I 
also wish to insist that its development attests to the way science rationally helps human 
imagination to grow. 
3. A clarification 
Putnam is of  course right on relative numbers as dictated by combinatorics. In situations 
like his thought experiment, for a reasonable error allowance (say 5% ) the neighborhood 
around the most probable outcome covers only a small fraction of  the total number of  
Ontology Studies 8, 2008  97
possible cases. Since in PMW each possibility counts as one world, regardless of  its relative 
amplitude in the total state, it follows that, for indefinitely many sorts of  imaginable final 
states, in PMW the majority of  observers should fail to confirm quantum mechanics. It 
thus turns out that PMW is far more at odds with ordinary ideas than generally realized, 
particularly regarding probabilities (about which our “natural” imagination is notoriously 
poor to begin with). Putnam is right regarding world numbers. However, I see several 
problems with his charge against PMW. 
 If  physical reality is as PMW says, how come we are so lucky to confirm quantum 
mechanics? I wish to suggest some possible lines of  reply on behalf  of  PMW. 
 Consider the issue of  confirming quantum mechanics in the 230 worlds involved in 
Putnam’s thought experiment. At least as presented, the proposed experiment doesn’t 
straightforwardly expose any interesting problems about the confirmation of  quantum 
mechanics. The reason is simple: The likes of  us are able to confirm quantum mechanics 
first and foremost because we are entities of  a physical sort which encompasses very 
numerous distinctly quantum-mechanical processes. What we call “human observers” 
simply would not arise without quantum mechanics “working properly” on a rather 
massive scale. Indeed, for a person actually to run the 30 experiments in question, a 
very great deal of  ordinary background physical regularity needs to be in place. Nobody 
could live (let alone act) in a world lacking that. My point, then, is that the description of  
Putnam’s thought experiment already presupposes numerous regularities operating well 
enough -not least very many of  a quantum mechanical sort. In the “weirdest” of  the 230 
world branches considered by Putnam (the ones in which the light color outcomes depart 
the most from quantum mechanical expectation values), the experimental frequencies 
yielded would be highly deviant with respect to the expectation values for the experiment, 
but little else could be deviant (otherwise neither Putnam nor his equipment would be 
there at all). It follows that, at least as far as the specific thought experiment at hand is 
concerned, the incoherence charge fails: in their respective branches all 230 Putnams are 
surrounded by available information that would allow them to confirm quantum mechanics 
rather splendidly, even if  most of  them may not do so through their particular series of  
“Schroedinger cat” experiments. To come to accept quantum mechanics, a person living 
in any of  the deviant branches envisaged by Putnam might simply look at the rest of  
his relative-branch milieu. Corroborations of  the quantum mechanical world would then 
come plentifully enough from thermodynamical, spectroscopic, radioactive phenomena 
and so forth -even raw qualitative phenomena (for example, the color of  the sky on a 
sunny day) would provide strong hints in the “right direction”.
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4. On luck
But, of  course, in an important way the above rejoinder is off  the mark, for surely it leaves 
intact an important insight against PMW. If  “most” world-histories are as utterly weird and 
inhospitable to physical humans as PMW dynamics appears to require, how come we are 
so lucky to find ourselves in such a “regular” history of  the world after all? 
 Perhaps Putnam’s deeper complaint is better construed as follows: out of  all the myriads 
of  actual histories envisaged in PMW, the vast majority correspond to utterly weird environments in 
which no confirmation of  quantum mechanics seems viable. In such worlds not only there can be no 
Putnams -there can be no life as we know it. At this juncture the force of  the complaint 
seems to shift to the issue of  “luck”, specifically to the question, “How come we are so 
lucky to live in one of  the comparatively very few worlds that allow for the likes of  stable 
planets, organic life and also us?” 
 But, isn’t this an old non-problem? We may be lucky to be the way we are, given the 
myriads of  “actual branches” existing in the total universe according to PMW. However, 
luck in this sense seems no different from that in which each of  us -as individuals- can be 
said to be “lucky” in many other ways -to have been born, belong to a species that made it 
through natural selection, be part of  a planet that had the right characteristics at the right 
time for our sort of  chemically-based life to be, and so on. If  this is correct, introducing 
this sense of  luck into the PMW narrative involves no special conceptual problem (unless 
of  course one wants to beg the question). Surely, confronted with the present worry, 
a PMW defender should bite the bullet and simply recognize that the type of  relative-
branch world in which “he” lodges fails to dominate in terms of  relative numbers, but 
then insist that being thus “lucky” in no way renders incoherent his (otherwise weird) 
proposal. The point is that PMW cannot be dismissed as incoherent merely because of  
basic combinatorics and the relativization of  actuality PMW involves. All that needs to be 
admitted is that, in the suggested way, PMW is simply furthering the clash of  physics with 
certain cherished beliefs -for example that the universe is made for us, revolves around us 
-the sort of  place where the likes of  us are to be expected as a matter of  some kind of  
“ontological entitlement”. It is not accidental that in his seminal article Everett likened his 
approach to that of  Copernicus, an early scientist renowned for having tamed our natural 
sense of  self-centeredness. Now PMW further spoils old intuitions in that direction, and a 
great deal more radically. Not necessarily a bad thing. 
5. Rational action
There is no denying that in PMW the vast majority of  world histories are utterly bizarre. 
Still, if  PMW is basically correct, then in every “ordinary” history, people in it would be 
right to expect future to unfold in a manner close enough to the probabilistic, quantum-
mechanically “normal” way. And yet, to return to Putnam’s stance, what can this mean once 
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the distinction between possibility and actuality is obliterated a-la-PMW? A different level 
of  response seems to be called for here.
 One reply, in the spirit of  Deutsch (1998), may run as follows: DeWittian denizens 
experience genuine uncertainty. In a measurement operation, between the time decoherence 
has done its work and the time the experimenter looks at the result, he is in an authentic 
state of  uncertainty as to which of  the expected successor branches he will find himself  
in. During this interval the experimenter knows that his successors form an indexed family 
(corresponding to the possible outcomes), but he doesn’t know which particular index he’s 
got. Suppose, then, that this experimenter carries on numerous measurements in which 
during the noted periods of  uncertainty he also bets on outcomes; and suppose further 
that he corroborates that the best betting strategy follows the quantum algorithm (that is, 
he confirms quantum mechanics). If  so, he would know from experience that his aims 
are generally better achieved when he follows quantum mechanics than when he does 
not.  That is, he corroborates that guiding his actions by the relevant quantum mechanical 
probabilities optimizes his gains. This reply seemingly matches the standard rationale for 
reading normalized quantum mechanical intensities as probabilities: one uses recorded 
frequencies to estimate “probabilities”, finds them in agreement with the quantum 
algorithm, and then prepares for the future accordingly. To this educated experimenter, in 
any branch history that extends long enough in time, the numbers yielded by the quantum 
algorithm are ratified both as objective frequencies and as basis for rational decision.
 But Putnam could reject the above move. If  both PMW and the finitude of  accessible 
branch histories are taken seriously, then every “possible” finite historical succession will 
be realized anyway. So, what “rational plans” can a PMW believer make regarding world 
outcomes?
  Enlightened by quantum mechanics, a PMW believer can influence his successor 
branches to this extent: in many situations he is able fix which of  the successor branches of  
his present world will have the largest amplitude. Still, Putnam may disallow this response 
as irrelevant –for, why would a sensible person take comfort in such a practice in a universe 
in which all the contemplated possibilities are bound to be “equally actualized”? 
 This connects with a methodological issue, already encountered in this paper, about 
being “lucky” too many times in a row. According to Putnam, our PMW advocate is lucky 
against the odds because of  the generally low ratio of  the number of  high-amplitude 
branches relative to the total number of  “equally real” branches out there. But notice the 
problematic character of  the two key notions of  number and equality played with here.
 How many DeWittian branches are there in a given situation? The standard assumption 
takes this number to be equal to the number of  possible outcomes, which is correct 
enough in many contexts. However, if  branches are a byproduct of  decoherence, then 
in general their number is not a quantity really well-defined. At any given time the number of  
branches equals that of  the state components of  the decoherence-preferred basis with 
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nonzero coefficient in the total state. But this spells out trouble in at least two ways. First, 
many of  the best candidates for preferred basis (conspicuously position) correspond to 
continuous quantities. The obvious move to meet this problem is coarse-graining, but this 
makes for a second source of  trouble, as coarse-graining introduces an epistemic aspect 
into the picture. Partitions coarser than ordinary levels of  precision will blur the state of  
macroscopic systems (which will thus get poorly modeled), while partitions that are much 
too refined will give rise to interfering adjacent branches (which will thus fail to qualify as 
representing “worlds”). Determining the “right” level of  coarse-graining requires judgment 
involving some degree of  arbitrariness. 
 At this point one may refuse to indulge in metaphysical revisionism, accept Putnam’s 
objection, and hold on to an essentialist position about probabilities. Alternatively, one 
may opt for conceptual revisionism and challenge some received assumptions about 
objective probabilities, particularly some which seem not nearly as compellingly motivated 
as generally supposed. One such assumption is that probabilities are essentially tied to the 
Kolmogorov conception (as opposed to the weaker claim that probabilities are modeled 
only approximately by the said conception). Equally questionable seems the rejection of  
the noted kind of  uncertainty at the end of  measurement operations as grounds for a 
“bottom-up” approach to probabilities. DeWittians may not quite end up with the standard 
concept, but surely theirs would be a critical generalization of  the initial concept, indeed 
one focused on probability’s old link with rational action. 
 But, to repeat, how might quantum theory guide rational action if  all the options one 
is meant to choose from are bound to be realized? What good can result from striving to 
reduce the quantum intensity of  unwanted branches?
 Here a MPW defender might seize on quantum intensities and try to appeal to their 
physicality.  One option Vaidman (1998 & 2002) would be to regard quantum intensities 
as a measure of  existence. I think this can be made compelling by explicitly introducing an 
element from Plato’s Natural philosophy, namely the notion that “being real” admits of  
degrees. The stress should be on the idea that that it is intensity that makes a branch actual, 
indeed that intensity gives a branch ontic weight. A related, seemingly complementary move, 
would be to interpret properly normalized intensities as giving the relative proportions for 
the actual branches in place (intensity ratios being much better defined than “number of  
branches”). From this latter perspective, when the intensity of  a given post-measurement 
total state is highly concentrated around the particular branch associated with outcome 
α, then the universe will contain massively more worlds in which the outcome is α.  The 
suggested notions of   “ontic weight” and “relative proportions” may be embedded in 
Deutsch’s radical proposal, that for each world or branch of  the total state there is a 
continuous infinity of  identical worlds. 
 The important point here is that, it seems, a PMW follower has available twin critical 
generalizations of  the notions of  “probability” and "number of  worlds". The generalizations 
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in question take the relative intensity of  any given branch as corresponding to the relative 
frequency of  the world represented by that branch in the totality of  many worlds. On this 
more intrepid PMW, the ratio of  quantum mechanically "deviant" to quantum mechanically 
"correct" branch-worlds would be minute, thus rendering unsurprising that we should 
find ourselves in a branch where quantum mechanics turns out to be confirmable. PMW 
followers would be left with a weird revision of  metaphysics, one advanced in response 
to the conceptual challenges posed by their weird picture of  the physical world. All very 
bizarre, of  course, but not bizarre enough to sustain a serious charge of  incoherence. 
 And so, in light of  all the above considerations, I think Putnam's incoherence charge 
against PMW, though clever, must be declared premature. The argument he provides does 
not expose terrible incoherence in PMW so much as additional "paradox" beyond the load 
carried by less extravagant versions of  quantum mechanics. 
 The universe described by PMW is weird relative to our natural intuitions. The vast 
majority of  the myriads of  indiscernible partial world histories that, according to PMW, 
make up the universe do not contain the kind of  structure needed to potentially confirm 
the theory by present scientific standards. However, in terms of  “numbers”, the exact 
reverse is true, at least on the suggested ontic interpretation of  branch numbers and branch 
intensities. The main point is that none of  the troubles spotted in connection with PMW, by 
themselves, render PMW incoherent the way Putnam suggests. Nor does it warrant one to 
claim that in PMW the notion of  probability is bound to "lose all meaning". To repeat, the 
concept of  probability can be turned empirical by science. In particular, one can maintain 
that all the quantum mechanical possibilities are actualized, yet further assert that revised, 
more general concepts of  actuality, “physical number” and probability are now in place. 
Such a defense could do this by taking the actuality of  individual world histories to be 
"unequal" in a new, distinctly quantum mechanical way -by taking the quantum amplitude 
as a measure of  ontic "weight". This aspect of  the world would be epistemically accessible 
only within a fraction of  the myriads of  distinct finite world histories that constitute 
the Universe (according to PMW). It would be in those branches, and presumably those 
branches only, that being both alive and thinking is possible. 
 Finally a brief  comment on the way science keeps opening and expanding the human 
mind. As I have insisted on previous papers in this series, many views that had long 
seemed "completely impossible" to hold are now scientifically well-established. As science 
gets more comprehensive and sophisticated, it looks as though its role as expediter of  
the growth of  the human imagination, indeed the human mind, has only just begun. The 
development of  PMW, I suggest, matters because it attests to this process of  growth. 
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